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Nature based tourism often involves many different economic 
agents, and different markets. Therefore, different types of 
market failures could be involved. For example, owners of a 
mangrove forest might not take into consideration that the 
quality of a tourist 
boat ride through 
the forest is a 
function of the 
quality of the 
mangrove forest. 
There could also be 
problems with 
market power. A 
provider of a certain 
tourist package 
might have market 
power, for example 
through regulations, 
and therefore have 
incentives to limit 
access. There is 
therefore room for 
different 
management 
strategies for the 
government, both involving direct regulation, but also 
facilitating negotiations between different agents. 
 
In this research project I look at the case of a tourist boat ride 
at the coast of the state of Nayarit, in Mexico. The boat ride 
goes through mangroves in which crocodile watching is an 
important part. 
 
Figure 1.-  Description of the boat ride chosen for this case 
study. 
 
In figure 1, I describe 
the different 
economic agents 
involved directly or 
indirectly with the 
boat ride; and the 
existence of some 
market failures: 
public goods (the 
open access problem 
of the boat riders), 
positive externalities 
mangrove increase 
the boat ride value) 




everal policies have S
been implemented at 
the site already. 




Some of these policies have been helpful; but some of them 
seem have failed.  Examples of the policies implemented at 
this site today are: creation of a monopoly, subsidizing 
productive activities, price control policies, and taxing the use 
of natural resources. 
 
Based on the current management, and the external effects 
involved, it is possible to simulate various management 
scenarios:  
 
No management (without public policy and without 
private negotiation).-  In this scenario, there is a free-
entrance of boat riders. Under this assumption the boat riders 
will set a price equal to the marginal cost and they will not 
pay for mangrove maintenance.  The crocodile farm will not 
receive subsidies and will run out of business.  Finally there 
will be a reduction in demand caused by the non-existence of 
mangroves and crocodiles.  This situation gives the worst 
outcomes of all the simulated strategies. 
 
Regulated access and price control without any other 
public policy and without private negotiation.-  Under this 
scenario the crocodile farm runs out of business creating a 
negative demand shock for boat rides due to the local 
extinction of crocodiles.  These regulations improve welfare if 
compared with the first scenario, but still letting the society 
worse of when compared with the current management. 
 
Current management.-  Subsidies to the crocodile farm, 
regulation of the number of boats allowed and price control 
policies.  This situation conduct to higher outcomes than the 
previous, because the positive externality of crocodiles has a 
very high impact on visitors welfare, and therefore on boat 
riders earnings.  
 
Regulated access, price control and negotiation between 
agents.-  For this scenario a new element is introduced to 
the analysis: negotiation.  This scenario is the one in which 
the highest social outcomes are obtained.  Comparing with 
the last scenario, there is a remarkable increase in social 
welfare from allowing negotiations.  Thus defining property 
rights (regulating the entrance of boat riders) and setting the 
conditions for having arrangements between economic 
agents may conduct to higher outcomes than the traditional 
subsidy policies.   
 
Figure 2.-  Social outcomes with different management 
strategies 
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It is true that when property rights are well defined and 
negotiations are possible, then the problem of externalities (in 
this case the positive externality of crocodiles) could be 
solved by the particular economic agents obtaining the most 
efficient social outcome possible.   But in this case, in which a 
good solution for creating property rights was limiting the 
open access, a monopoly was created.  With this second 
market failure involved, the most efficient outcome was 
reached when that policy was complemented with an antitrust 
policy for controlling the monopoly price.   
 
The actual management strategy is not an integrated 
conceived strategy.   It is more like a learning-by-doing 
strategy that involved different governmental agencies that 
could hardly agree with other agency policies.  This way of 
doing policy has created the current situation: (i) the creation 
of a monopoly, (ii) price control policies, and (iii) the use of 
government funds for subsidizing an activity that will not need 
any subsidy if negotiation was possible.  All of these policies 
seem to be a bad idea, but all together conduct to a social 
outcome that is 315 percent higher that the outcome of doing 
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